The Right to Record and
Broadcast Public Legislative
Proceedings
Most legislative bodies in the United States hold their proceedings open to attendance by the public.' When they do, the first
amendment protects the right of the press 2 to attend the proceedings and to report about them to the public.3 Many legislatures,
however, enforce rules that prohibit reporters from broadcasting
their proceedings or from recording them by any means other
than handwritten notes. 4 This comment suggests that the first
amendment protects not only the right of the press to attend public
legislative proceedings, but also its right to record and broadcast
them. The comment begins by analyzing first amendment protections in terms of the entire process of reporting news, focusing on
the press's right to gather news by attending public events and
recording information concerning the events by a variety of
1. Many are required to do so by statute. See generally Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!
Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 480 (1973) (open-meeting statutes of thirty-five states are surveyed). Such statutes
usually provide for closed meetings under specified circumstances. Id. at 483-87. Although
both houses of Congress and many state legislatures have the authority to vote to hold closed
sessions, they rarely do. H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 182-92 (1954); F. THAYER,
LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 33-40 (1956).

An argument might be made that protection of the freedom of the press would require a
high burden of justification for denying access to any legislative proceeding, but this comment will be concerned only with the constitutionality of restricting certain methods of
recording once physical access is authorized. Cf note 27 infra.
2. The press protected by the first amendment is broadly defined to include "in its
historic connotation ... every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). Media that have been held
entitled to this first amendment protection, beyond the books, newspapers, and handbills
familiar to the amendment's authors, include motion pictures, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952), radio, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131, 166 (1948) (dictum), and television, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (dictum);
Robinson v. American Broadcasting Co., 441 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (6th Cir. 1971).
3. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
4. Neither house of Congress permits electronic recording or broadcasting of floor sessions, although congressional committees are authorized to allow them. See notes 123, 127,
128 infra. One or both houses of thirteen state legislatures have rules banning live radio or
television broadcasts from their chambers. Of these, two allow taping privileges. In several of
the other states, approval by legislative membership or officers is required. Hearings on
Congress and Mass CommunicationsBefore theJoint Comnmn.
on CongressionalOperations, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. App. 949-50 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
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methods. It then identifies and examines the restriction of first
amendment rights produced by prohibiting the tape recording 5 or
broadcasting of open legislative proceedings. Finally, the comment
evaluates arguments that recording or broadcasting would be
detrimental to legislative proceedings and that rules less restrictive
than complete bans would not prevent the potential harm, and
concludes that they are insufficient to justify the restriction of the
freedom of the press.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
THE PRESS TO RECORD PUBLIC EVENTS
A. The Reporting Process and the First Amendment
The process of reporting events to the public may be divided
analytically into several successive steps. First, a representative of
the press medium must physically attend the event 6 and record
information about it. After organizing the recorded information
into appropriate form (a "report"), the medium disseminates it
generally so that members of the public finally receive the information that has been gathered. Each step of the reporting process
necessarily depends upon the performance of the previous steps,
and restraint on the press at any step thus restricts its ability to perform its ultimate function of informing the public. Because a basic
purpose of the first amendment is to foster a free flow of information concerning public affairs to the people-the ultimate
decision makers and source of governmental power in a democratic society 7 -the courts have developed first amendment protections for the entire reporting process. The right of the public
to receive information is closely guarded,8 even in rare instances in
which the party seeking to communicate the information lacks the
right to disseminate it.9 Prior restraint by the government on dis5. Throughout this comment, tape recording will be used to refer to both audio and
video tape recording.
6. The representative need not be formally affiliated with the medium, but physical
attendance by some cooperating observer is necessary in any case.
7. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1044, 1046 (1975); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1971); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811, 2821-22 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-15
(1966) Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255.
8. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and authorities cited therein.
9. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (right to receive mail
from prisoners); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (dictum) (right of
citizen to hear views of alien); Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of
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semination of information by the press is all but completely
prohibited, 10 and the Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment also prohibits the government from requiring the
press to publish particular material."
Protecting the right of members of the press to perform the very
first steps of the reporting process-attending and recording public events-is no less essential in guaranteeing a free flow of information to the public. This prerequisite "right to gather news"' 12 has
been recognized by the Supreme Court, but has been given limited
scope in recent cases. In Branzburg v. Hayes,3 newsmen asserted a
privilege against revealing confidential news sources to a grand
jury, arguing that their ability to gather news from such sources
would be impaired if they were forced to reveal the identity of
those sources.' 4 Although the Court stated that "news gathering is
not without its First Amendment protections"' 5 and that "without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
tould be eviscerated,"' 6 the five-member majority concluded that
the "consequential, but uncertain" burden on news gathering that
resulted from forcing reporters to testify was outweighed by more
direct public interests in law enforcement and in effective grand
Pharmacy, 373 F. Snpp. 683, 685-87 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris. noted,-95 S. Ct. 17389
(1975) (right of consumer to receive drug price advertisements).
10. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-19 (1931).
11. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974). The integrity
of the editorial step of the reporting process, in which the information gathered is organized
into the form in which it is to be disseminated, is implicitly guaranteed by the correlative
prohibitions against prior restraints and compulsory publication. See id.
Knotty problems remain, however, in defining the extent of these first amendment protections for the broadcast media in contrast with the print media. Some degree of control by
the FCC over broadcast content is justified on the theory that broadcast licensees, as holders
of temporary monopolies of scarce public resources, cannot be permitted to air only their
own views. Accordingly, the FCC has developed the Fairness Doctrine and right to reply
rules. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02
(1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969). The Supreme
Court, in evaluating FCC regulation in Columbia Broadcasting, recognized the necessity of
balancing the broadcasters' first amendment interests in performing the editorial function
against the public's first amendment interest in receiving diverse views. 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973). But apart from justifiable FCC regulation, broadcasters may assert first amendment
rights against prior restraints on their broadcasts. Robinson v. American Broadcasting Co.,
441 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1971).
12. See generally Comment, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 838 (1971).
13. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
14. Id. at 679-80.
15. Id. at 707.
16. Id. at 681.
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jury proceedings. 1 7 The Court stated as well that it found no basis
for a "constitutional right of 1special
access to information not avail8
able to the public generally."
In Pell v. Procunier,'9 a similarly divided Court held that prison
rules prohibiting reporters from conducting face-to-face interviews
with selected inmates violated neither the inmates' 20 nor the
reporters' 21 first amendment rights. 22 After considering both the
importance of the government's interest in restricting access to
the prison in order to maintain prison discipline and the availability of alternative means by which reporters could obtain information about prisons, 3 the Court held that "the Constitution
17. Id. at 690-91. Justice Powell filed a separate concurrence "to emphasize what seems
to me to be the limited nature of the Court's holding. The Court does not hold that
newsmen . . . are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in
safeguarding their sources." Id. at 709; cf. note 22 infra.
18. 408 U.S. at 684. The Branzburg Court relied on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), in
which a private citizen (not a newsman) had contended that the Secretary of State's statutorily authorized refusal to validate his passport for travel to Cuba abridged his first amendment right to gather information about the Cuban government. Id. at 16. Conceding that the
Secretary's refusal "renders less than wholly free the flow of information" about Cuba, id.,
the Zemel Court held that the restriction was on rights of action rather than speech, and
hence could not be violative of the first amendment. The Branzburg Court quoted the
following portion of Zemel:
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument
in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry
into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information...
but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right
to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.
408 U.S. at 684 & n.22 (1972), quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
On the same day it decided Branzburg, however, the Court gave more limited application
to the same language in Zemel by rejecting the government's argument in Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), that the refusal to permit a foreign scholar to enter the United
States was merely a restriction on action and not on first amendment rights. Id. at 764.
Although the Court found that the government's refusal was justified by the overriding
power of Congress to control the admission of aliens, it recognized that in absence of that
power, a first amendment claim of a right to hear the scholar might properly be raised by
those who sought his entry. Id. at 765. See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information,
71 COLL.t. L. REv. 838, 845-46 (1971).
19. 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974). Pell was heard and decided with its companion case Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811 (1974), which considered an identical prohibition of
interviews at a federal prison.
20. 94 S. Ct. at 2807.
21. Id.at 2810.
22. Justice Powell, concurring in the Court's holding against the prisoners in Pell but
dissenting from its holding that the reporters' right to gather news was not violated, had
written a concurring opinion against the newsmen's claim in Branzburg. See note 17 supra.
Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Branzburg while complaining of "[t]he Court's crabbed
view of the First Amendment," 408 U.S. at 725, joined the majority against the newsmen's
claim in Pell and Saxbe and wrote the opinion of the Court. Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
614-15 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting); note 33 infra.
23. 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2804-06, 2808 (1974).
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[does not impose] upon government the affirmative duty to make
information not available to
available to journalists sources of
24
members of the public generally.
Both Branzburg and Pell involved reporters' claims that their access to news sources was protected under a first amendment right
to gather news. The Court in both cases considered that right to be
subject to limitations justified by important conflicting societal interests but held only that no such justification need be shown
where the physical access sought by the press is broader than that
accorded to the general public.2 5 Thus, the Court focused on defining the scope of "public" events and information to which the
press has a right of physical access, without investigating the justifications for denying access to the public itself beyond noting the
importance of the government's interests in grand jury effectiveness and prison control. 26 In neither case did the Court determine the extent to which the right of the press to record information must be protected once physical access to a news source, or
attendance at a newsworthy event, is authorized. 27 Resolving that
24. Id. at 2810.
25. See id.; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). The Court stated in Pell's
"constitutionally indistinguishable" companion case that "it is unnecessary to engage in any
delicate balancing of . . . penal considerations against the legitimate demands of the First
Amendment. For it is apparent that the sole limitation imposed on newsgathering . . . is
justified by . . . 'the truism that prisons are institutions where public access is generally
limited.'" Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811, 2814, 2815 (1974). C'. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1047 (1975) (holding that once records are made
public, the right of the press to disseminate information may not be overridden by a claim
of a right to privacy).
Courts have, however, also recognized the first amendment news gathering right of members of the press to obtain access at least equal to that expressly granted by the government
to other members of the press, even if the public has no right to such access. See, e.g.,
Borrecca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D. Hawaii 1974) (access to mayor's press conferences); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775-77 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (access to state legislative
press galleries); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 25-27 (D.D.C. 1973) (access to congressional press galleries); Quad-City
Community News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 13-14 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (access to
police files).
26. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972); Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct.
2800, 2808-09 (1974). Defining the exact limits of the right of access enjoyed by the public,
or the scope of public events and information, is a difficult task in itself. See Comment, The
Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1507 (1974).
27. Justice Powell, dissenting in Pell and Saxbe, argued that the press must have greater
access than the public in order to perform its first amendment function of providing the
public with the information necessary for intelligent self-government. Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811, 2821-22 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). After considering the
asserted governmental interests in limiting access, weighed against this important first
amendment right of the press, Justice Powell concluded that no absolute prohibition of
face-to-face interviews with selected prisoners could be justified. Id. at 2823-25. He specifi-
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issue requires the consideration of conflicting interests in proand in preventing interference
tecting the right to gather news
28
with governmental functions.

B.

Limits on the Right of the Press to Record Public
Proceedings
The Supreme Court has considered the issue of the press's right
to record public proceedings only once. In Estes v. Texas,2 9 the
Court held that a criminal defendant was denied due process because portions of his trial were filmed and telecast. 30 The point on
which the Court focused its attention 31 was whether the defendant
should be required to show actual prejudice or whether prejudice
should be presumed from the fact of televising.3 2 To reach its
result, however, the Court was required to consider as well the
argument presented by broadcasters' organizations as amici curiae
that to prevent courtroom filming and telecasting would infringe
broadcasters' first amendment rights. 33 The broadcasters argued
cally refrained from addressing the further question of whether the right to record information with television equipment could justifiably be curtailed even if press access to the prison
was constitutionally protected. Id. at 2815 n. 1.
28. To subject the press's right to record to the test of coextensivity with the rights of the
public, which Branzburg and Pell applied in considering the right of physical access, would be
to vitiate the right of the press to gather news altogether. Although it may be appropriate to
allow reporters access only to public information and events, their right to record information must be broader than that of the public if they are to make effective use of such access
in performing the first amendment function of the press.
29. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
30. Id. at 535. Estes marked the climax of thirty years of debate over the question of
broadcasting trials. After the radio broadcast of Bruno Hauptman's trial for the Lindbergh
kidnapping, see State v. Hauptman, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935), the American Bar Association adopted Canon 35 of the Canons
ofJudicialEthics (superseded by Canon 3.A(7) of the ABA Code ofJudicialConduct) forbidding
photography or broadcasting in courtrooms. The history of Canon 35 is outlined in an
appendix to the opinion of Justice Harlan in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 596 (1965). At the
time of the trial in the Estes case, forty-eight states and the federal courts did not permit
broadcasting from the courtroom, a fact which the Court found "most telling" in reaching its
conclusion. Id. at 540. Colorado, after hearings conducted by a state supreme court justice,
In re Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956), had
decided to leave broadcasting to the trial judge's discretion. For a review of the competing
%iewpoints, arguments, and decisions before Estes, see Comment, Constitutional Aspects of
Television in the Courtroom, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 48 (1966).
31. The opinion of the Court by Justice Clark devoted twelve pages to the due process
question and less than one page to the first amendment issue; three pages of Chief Justice
Warren's thirty-outr page concurrence (joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg) treated
the first amendment question.
32. See 381 U.S. at 542-44 (opinion of the Court); id. at 601-02 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33. Justice Stewart was technically correct to point out in dissent that "no First Amendment claim is made in this case," id. at 614, since the issue was whether defendant had
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that recording is a right protected by the first amendment, and
that to permit newspaper reporters to take handwritten notes in
the courtroom during a criminal trial while forbidding broadcast
reporters from recording electronically would discriminate unfairly
between the two media. 4
The Court answered the discrimination argument, and at the
same time reemphasized the determinative factor in the case, by
noting that television and radio reporters were subject to the identical restriction as newspaper reporters and all other members of
the public-that the activities of those in attendance must not
jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. 35 The majority
stated that whatever the rights of the press to record might be
outside the courtroom, 36 inside it those rights were subordinate to
the preservation of a fair trial, "the most fundamental of all
freedoms. '37 While reaffirming its decisions that trial courts cannot
prevent reporters from attending public trials and subsequently
publishing even prejudicial reports outside the courtroom, 3 8 the
Court held that insofar as press coverage inside the courtroom
-apart from the mere presence of the reporters-might affect the
39
course of a trial, it must be controlled.
Turning then to an evaluation of the impact of broadcasting on
the defendant's right to a fair trial, 40 the Estes Court identified
received a fair trial. He stated further, however, that "[t]he suggestion that there are limits
upon the public's right to know what goes on in the courtroom causes me great concern.
The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its
presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the area of
First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 614-15. In view of the concern with the press's right to
gather news expressed by Justice Stewart in Estes and in Branzburg, see 408 U.S. at 725-28,
his contrary vote and opinion in Pell mark a dramatic change of position. See note 22 supra.
34. Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters and the Radio Television News Directors Ass'n
as Amici Curiae at 7-12. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
35. 381 U.S. at 539-40. Of the majority, only Justice Harlan met the discrimination
argument head on, admitting that telecasting trials "might well provide the most accurate
and comprehensive means" of reporting trials. He concluded, however, that such considerations "are not arguments of constitutional proportions." 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. Chief Justice Warren admitted that "the television industry.., has a proper area of
activities and limitations beyond which it cannot go with its cameras. That area does not
extend into an American courtroom." Id. at 585. Justice Harlan agreed, saying "the line is
drawn at the courthouse door; within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than
those of any other member of the public." Id. at 589.
37. Id. at 540. See id. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 541-42, citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
39. Id. at 539-40 (1965).
40. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, PROJECT
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three different kinds of potentially prejudicial effects: increased
trial publicity, physical disruption of proceedings, and psychological distraction of trial participants. The majority thought that the
first, increased publicity, could affect a trial in a variety of ways:
4
jurors might observe delayed telecasts of trials still in progress, '
the rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of others would become virtually impossible to enforce,
trial participants would be more readily recognized and accosted in
public during the trial, and unbiased jurors for new trials would
become more difficult to find. 42 Even though the Court had previously held that the first amendment protects the press's basic right
to attend and report about trials 43 as part of the right to publish
news, the majority recognized the power of a trial court to limit
publicity under rules governing the one physical area in which the
defendant's rights are of overriding concern, the courtroom
44
itself.
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND

FREE PRESS ("Reardon Report") (1966); D. GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1966);
Symposium 1967, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 857 (1967).

41. This was not a danger in Estes itself because the jury had been sequestered throughout the trial. 381 U.S. at 546.
42. Id. at 546-57. The Court emphasized that the sixth amendment requires a trial
to be public solely to protect the defendant from "star chamber" proceedings, id. at 538-39;
see id. at 583-84 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring), and not to
educate or entertain the public. See id. at 575-76 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Court
thought that the amendment's protective function was satisfactorily served by the number of
persons who could physically attend court sessions and that it would not be furthered by
telecasts of trials. See id. at 584 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 588-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). The sixth amendment, then, was seen as granting no independent right to the public
to observe trials either in person or by television. But cf. Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792
(4th Cir. 1965) (dictum that the public has interest in open trials in order to prevent
prejudice in favor of, as well as against, defendants). The Supreme Court has said that a
defendant "has no absolute right to compel a private trial." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24, 35 (1965) (dictum). In Estes, however, the Court sought to insure that public trials would
not become more public than necessary, when their fairness was endangered.
43. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
44. This power was reemphasized in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), where
defendant's conviction was reversed for prejudicial publicity and the "carnival atmosphere"
in the courtroom at trial. Id. at 358. The Court said that the trial court's error was
compounded by its holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the
trial ....
. . . As we stressed in Estes, the presence of the press must be limited when it is
apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged. Bearing in
mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen ....
Id. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted). The exercise of the trial court's power through "gag
orders" arguably raises serious first amendment questions apart from the issue of the freedom of the press. See generally Warren & Abell, Free Press-FairTrial: The "Gag Orde," A
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The weight to be given to the second potentially prejudicial effect of broadcasting, physical disruption by equipment and personnel, is left uncertain by Estes. Only four members of the majority thought that the record from the pretrial hearing, where
physical disruption was quite apparent, 45 was properly before the
Court; 4 6 at the trial itself physical disruption was virtually
nonexistent. 4 7 The majority was more concerned with the third
effect, trial participants' psychological reactions to knowledge that
they were being televised. 48 The Court thought that nervousness
resulting from lack of television experience would be especially
distracting to jurors and witnesses 49 and that attorneys and judges
50
might be tempted to play for the television audience's attention.
Neither effect could contribute to the fair determination of guilt or
innocence, and the Court thought them likely to impede that
process.5 1
California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 51 (1972); Note, Silence Orders, 6 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 595 (1971). But see United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (affirming contempt conviction of criminal defendants
for violating silence order); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (refusing to enjoin silence orders imposed on criminal counsel).
45. 381 U.S. at 535-36; see id. at 586 (App. to Opinion of Warren, C.J., concurring,
Photographs nos. 1-6).
46. Justice Harlan thought that only the trial record was properly before the Court, id. at
588 (Harlan, J., concurring), as did the four dissenters. Id. at 609-10 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Broadcast reporters were confined to a camouflaged booth at the rear of the courtroom. Id. at 537; see id. at 586 (App. to Opinion of Warren, C.J., concurring, Photograph no.
7).
48. "[T]he evil of televised trials.., lies not in the noise and appearance of the cameras,
but in the trial participants' awareness that they are being televised." Id. at 570 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring); see id. at 546.
49. Id. at 545-47.
50. Id. at 548; see id. at 565, 578-79 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Court admitted that
"some of these dangers . . . are present as well in newspaper coverage of any important
trial," id. at 548, but suggested that the difference in the degree of the danger produced by
telecasting justified a tighter restriction.
51. Many judges and commentators have expressed the contrary view, based on their
experiences, that telecasting trials has no deleterious effects. One judge, for example, has
described the televised trial of a defendant accused of dynamiting an airplane in flight,
concluding that there was no evidence of any distraction of the trial participants from the
"essential dignity of the proceedings." Hall, Colorado's Six Years' Experience Without Canon 35,
48 A.B.A.J. 1120, 1121 (1962). A survey of members of the bar who participated in or
observed a televised trial in Texas found that "the fact that the trial was being televised
seemed to dignify the proceedings" and that "none of the participants expressed any objection to televising future trials in the same manner. Generally, the response was that they
would lavor it." Waco-McLennon County Bar Ass'n, Courtroom Television, 19 TEXAS B.J. 73,
108 (1956). See also, e.g., In re Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296
P.2d 456 (1956); Lyles %.State, 330 P.2d 734, 742-45 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); In re Mack,
386 Pa. 251, 274, 126 A.2d 679, 687 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Quiat, The Freedom
of Pressure and the Explosive Canon 35, 33 RocKY Mr. L. REV. 11 (1960); Wright, A Judge's
View: The News Media and CritninalJustice,50 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126-27 (1964).
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Although the majority in Estes was primarily concerned with the
prejudicial effects of recording and broadcasting on the trial itself
and not with the separate issue of the extent of the press's right to
record information at a public proceeding, the implications of the
decision go further. For where there is a strong probability of
prejudice to the fairness of a trial, the right to record is capable of
being limited within the physical boundaries of the courtroom. The
majority's opinions indicate, however, that where the threat of
prejudice is less than that found in Estes, or in areas outside the
criminal courtroom, the first amendment right to record and
broadcast could not be so easily restricted.5 2 The extent to which
that right will be protected in circumstances other than those present in Estes is suggested by several recent cases.
The reporter's right to record both by memory and by pencil
and paper in the courtroom was vindicated in United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,53 in which the Fifth Circuit overturned district court orders that forbade network artists either to
sketch pictures of a criminal trial inside the courtroom or to broadcast sketches made from memory outside the courtroom. 54 Rejecting the government's argument that the dangers of prejudice presumed in Estes justified the orders, the court ruled that in the
absence of a showing of actual disruption or distraction, a ban on
sketching violated the network's constitutional right to gather
news. 5 5 In support of its conclusion, the court cited Dorfman v.

52.

See note 36 supra. The opinion of the Court concludes:
It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the adjust-

ment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting
upon the fairness of trials. But we are not dealing here with future developments in the
field of electronics. Our judgment cannot be rested on the hypothesis of tomorrow but
must take the facts as they are presented today.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551-52 (1965).
53. 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 103.
55. Id. at 106-07. The Fifth Circuit, noting that no other court had sought to ban
courtroom sketching, found the district court's rules "overly broad and thus invalid." Id.

Nearly the identical issue had been presented in Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Hewicker, 147 Cal. App. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 236 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), where a television
reporter stied to compel a trial judge to allow the reporter's shorthand secretary to take
notes in the judge's criminal courtroom. Id. at 511, 305 P.2d at 237. The judge argued that
transcripts of the court reporter's notes were available and that his power to control
courtroom conduct had been properly invoked. Id. But the appellate court, considering the
order a prior restraint, id. at 512, 305 P.2d at 238, noted that no evidence of disturbance had
been presented and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled "at any public hearing in the
court where he is rightfully in attendance to take such notes as he may desire concerning the
proceedings in any form selected by him so long as it does not interfere with the orderly
conduct of the proceedings .
Id. at 514, 305 P.2d at 239.
I..."
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Meiszner, 56 another sequel to Estes. In Dorfman, press representatives sought to enjoin a district court rule that prohibited photography and broadcasting in connection with any judicial proceeding on twelve floors of a twenty-seven floor federal courthouse and
office building, including the large ground-floor lobby and an
open plaza outside.5 7 The Seventh Circuit invalidated the rule as
overbroad insofar as it applied to areas other than floors on which
courtrooms were located. 58 Although it conceded that some potential for prejudice might result from allowing photography in the
areas from which it was lifting the ban, the court held that any such
"prior restraint on the press" must be justified by an "immediate
'59
threat to the judicial proceedings.
The press's right to record public events not connected with
criminal trials was upheld in Schnell v. City of Chicago60 and Channel
10, Inc. v. Gunnarson.61 In Schnell, a case arising from press attempts to cover street demonstrations during the 1968 Democratic
National Convention, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of
a complaint filed by news photographers alleging that police officers had violated their "constitutional right to gather and report
news, and to photograph news events. ' 62 In Channel 10 the court
held that a television cameraman's right to gather news had been
infringed by police interference with his cameras while he was
filming an arrest in public. 6 3 The court ordered that the police refrain from disturbing the cameraman or his equipment unless he
'64
was actually "interfering with or endangering them in their work.
Viewed in the light of the Columbia Broadcasting,Dorfman, Schnell,
and Channel 10 cases, the limits of the Estes holding become apparent. These cases together establish that the right to gather news
56. 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 560-61.
58. Id. at 562. The court thought that the ban was proper in the areas immediately
surrounding the first-floor elevators as well. Id.
59. Id. at 563.
60. 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969).
61. 337 F. Supp. 634 (D. Minn. 1972).
62. 407 F.2d at 1085.

63. 337 F. Supp. at 635-36.
64. Id. at 638. The police claimed that they had seized the camera because Minnesota law
forbids release of identities of juveniles who are arrested, and that they did not know at the
time whether the arrestees were juveniles; in fact, they were not. Id. at 636.
The Channel 10 court cited Gazette Publishing Co. v. Cox, Cause No. IP 65-C-528 (S.D.

Ind., May 2, 1967), an apparently similar case in which it was held that a publisher and its
employees had a constitutional right "to have access to and to make use of the public streets,
roads and highways ... for the purpose of observing and recording in writing and photographically the events which occur there." 337 F. Supp. at 636.
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includes the right to record as well as to attend news events occurring in public. Columbia Broadcastingand Dorfman demonstrate that
the presumption of trial prejudice that justified the restriction of
press recording rights in Estes is valid only for certain recording
methods and only within the confines of the courthouse; beyond
these limits a showing of actual prejudice to the criminal trial is
required. 5 Channel 10 and Schnell hold further that outside the
trial context, actual interference with proper governmental functions 66 must be shown before the right to record, even by television
cameras, may be restricted.
The substantiality of the interference with governmental processes that must be shown to justify restrictions on the right of the
press to record and broadcast depends upon the extent to which
these restrictions infringe upon interests protected by the first
amendment. Outside the area of criminal trials, in which Estes established a presumption of prejudice that would justify prohibitions against recording and broadcasting, it is important to ascertain the first amendment interests implicated and the weight to be
given them in the final balancing.
II.

RESTRICTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD AND
BROADCAST PUBLIC LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Rules that limit the use of certain methods of recording public
legislative proceedings impinge upon protected first amendment
interests of the press, and upon inextricable interests of the public,
when they impede the free flow of information about the proceed65. The presumption that a criminal defendant cannot receive a fair trial in the presence
of courtroom photography has also been sharply limited in other cases. See, e.g., Bradley v.
Texas, 470 F.2d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming conviction over defendant's claim
that still and motion picture photography at his trial violated due process, apparently finding a distinction between motion picture and television cameras); Bell v. Patterson, 279 F.
Supp. 760, 769-70 (D. Colo.), affd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955
(1971) (affirming conviction over defendant's claim that still photography during trial and
televising ofjur's return and judge's reading of verdict denied him due process).
66. Injur) to individual interests arising from the effects of recording and broadcasting
on the personal sensitivities of participants in public events is not sufficient by itself to justify
restricting the rights of the press. In an analogous area, ordinary tort remedies for invasion
of privac% or defamation are unavailable to public officials or public figures, see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), unless information that is
false is disseminated with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity, see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., supra at 334 & n.6. Thus, participants in public events usually have no legal
recourse for psichological injury resulting from press coverage. These limitations on the
tort repnedies are imposed precisely because the first amendment favors the recording
and dissemination of reports about public events over the protection of personal sensitivities.
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ings to the citizenry. Once an impediment to this protected flow of
information is shown, the restrictive rules can be justified only by a
clear showing that the potential harm to the operation of the legislative process outweighs the rules' encroachment on first amendment interests.
Reporters may record information concerning a public event by
various methods, including using their memories, making handwritten notes and sketches, and recording sounds or visual images
with a tape recorder, a still photographic camera, or a motion
picture or television camera. It can be argued that the dissemination of substantially equivalent information about legislative proceedings to the public is possible under rules that restrict tape
recording and broadcasting, since alternative methods of recording
are available. 67 For example, print and broadcast reports could be
organized from handwritten notes or from the verbatim transcripts
of proceedings and other official reports produced by many legislatures. These alternatives, however, are not equivalent in their
effectiveness. Rules that limit the press to recording legislative proceedings by such methods produce a significant decrease in the
quality of the information ultimately received by the public, in
terms of its accuracy and its timeliness. The extent of this restriction on the right of the press to gather news and on the free flow
of public information must be determined, if only roughly, in
order to weigh it against the arguably justifying governmental interest.
Each method of recording has unique capabilities and limitations, and the uses towhich each method may be put by the print
media and the broadcast media differ as well. 68 Thus, specific restrictions, viewed in the light of their impact on different media,

67. The existence of alternative methods of recording is one ground on which several
state courts have upheld rules against recording and broadcasting legislative proceedings.
See 1590 Broadcasting Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 N.H. 258, 260, 306 A.2d 49, 51
(1973); cf. Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 6-8, 310 A.2d
156, 159-61 (1973); Educational Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Ronan, 68 Misc. 2d 776, 779, 328
N.Y.S.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1972). These cases, however, reflect a narrow view of the
press's right to record that is inconsistent with the protection of the right to gather news that
has been accorded by other courts. See text and notes at notes 83-86 infra.
68. Although a newspaper, for example, could use sound-on-film cameras to record
events, it could not utilize much of the increased accuracy that they would provide. The
organizer (writer) of a newspaper report could view the films of an event repeatedly-giving
him some advantage over a one time viewer-but he still must reduce the event to printed
words because that is the form in which his medium disseminates reports. The newspaper
therefore confines itself to recording events in ways most usable in printed reports, and the
marginal increase in accuracy of sound-on-filn cameras does not justify their cost.

1975]

Right to BroadcastLegislative Proceedings

produce qualitative differences in the information disseminated
and received by the public.
Prohibition of tape recording handicaps print media reporters'
efforts to provide full, accurate, and timely accounts of legislative
proceedings. 69 A reporter taking handwritten notes cannot record
lengthy verbatim quotes as easily or effectively as with a tape
recorder,70 and the accuracy of reports organized from handwritten notes cannot be verified as they can by comparisons to original
tape recordings. Although many legislative bodies provide verbatim
transcripts or summaries of proceedings, a period of time must
elapse in their transcription, printing, and distribution. 7 1 Thus,
even where such records are available, tape recording enables print
reporters to publish full and accurate reports while legislative
events are still fresh news, rather than a day or a week later. The
importance of the print media's ability to provide the public with
full, accurate, and timely accounts is underscored by the fact that
broadcast coverage, because of inherent time limitations, may be
72
unable to provide more than summaries of some events.
The prohibition of tape recording also has a negative impact on
broadcast reporting, for similar reasons: a completely accurate and
69. See Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 6, 310 A.2d 156,
159 (1973).
70. See generally Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v.Hewicker, 147 Cal. App. 2d 509,
511, 305 P.2d 236, 237 (1957) (plaintiff was a television journalist).
71. See id.
72. Although a newspaper can adjust the amount of information it disseminates to some
extent by adding or subtracting pages, the amount of information broadcast media may
disseminate is strictly defined in terms of hours, minutes, and seconds. See Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 & n.22 (1974); E. EPSTEIN, NEws FRO.I
NOWHERE 78-91 (1973); Project, Mass Media and the First
Amnendmnent in a Free Society, 60 GEO.
L.J. 867, 937 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Project]. Because of this limitation, the broadcast
media must use a combination of films and tapes of events, as well as summary reports
initially recorded in the same manner as newspaper reports. Events of great interest are
broadcast in their entirety. Less important events are reported through combinations of
taped or filmed reports and summary reports. See E. EPSTEIN, supra at 152-54; Heaings on
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 BeJore the Special Subconmm. on Legislative Reorganization
of the House Conln. on Rules, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 64 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Hea ings].
Thus, as one well-known television news reporter has written:
The news magazines, newspapers, and television news-contrary to some popular
belief-do not compete with each other in an editorial sense.... [T]elexision's unique
ability to carry the viewer to the scene of the story ... gives [the] afternoon news [paper]
story another set of dimensions: the dimensions of sight and sound....
The other side of the coin is the limitation of the daily evening [telexision news]
round-up program .... These daily newscasts can only supplement newspapers....
The newspaper, and the magazine, remain the source of detailed, in-depth, permanent
record....
Cronkite, Television and the News, in THE EIGHTH ART 237 (1962).
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timely report of public proceedings is made more difficult to produce. In addition, prohibition of tape recording prevents broadcast
media, especially radio, from broadcasting tapes of legislative
events themselves. Such broadcasts improve the quality of the information that the public receives by removing the intermediary
party-the writer-who in print reporting must stand between the
event and the public, and by permitting the listener to hear
73
nuances of tone and inflection that are lost in a printed record.
Moreover, live radio broadcasts permit instantaneous reporting,
without the lapse of time needed by print media to organize and
disseminate reports after an initial recording is made. 74 Thus, just
as prohibitions against tape recording impede the ability of the
print media to provide accurate reports within a short time, the
prohibition of broadcasting also impedes the unique ability of radio
to report legislative proceedings With even greater celerity.
The impact upon the public of filmed or live television coverage
is unequalled by the other forms of news reporting. The public
relies more on television news than on other media, both for general news coverage7 5 and for coverage of governmental and political affairs,7 6 and it places more trust in the accuracy of television
news than in the accuracy of news reported by other media.7 7
Television shares the advantages of radio in the timeliness of reports it is able to disseminate. In addition, video coverage enhances
the quality of the reports disseminated, not merely by adding visual
nuances to the viewers' perception of an event,7 8 but by involving
them in the event through the combination of sight and sound as if
they- were attending it in person.7 9 Television broadcasting, by
making legislative events more immediate and accessible to the
public, can increase the public's interest in and knowledge of the
legislative process as no other method of recording and dissemination can. 80
73. When newspapers print verbatim transcripts of legislative proceedings, they too provide unintermediated coverage, but the nuances of speech are still lost.
74. Cf. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1935).
75. Project, supra note 72, at 936.
76. S. REP. No. 1275, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1974).
77. Project, supra note 72, at 936.
78. Such nuances often affect meaning as well as reveal character, as appellate courts
universally recognize in their deference to trial courts' findings of fact that are based on
testimony. See, e.g., Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856, 858 n.1 (10th Cir.
1973); Moskowitz v. Peariso, 458 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1972); Dyer v. McDougall, 201
F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952).
79. See Project, supra note 72, at 937; Cronkite, supra note 72, at 237-38.
80. A study of the effects of telecasts of the Florida legislature found that state high
school students' general interest in the political system had increased, as well as the level of
their discussion about politics, their related reading of state legislative news in the newspa-
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Thus, the effectiveness of the reporting process and the quality
of the information disseminated to the public are diminished by
restrictions on the use of certain recording methods to report public legislative proceedings. Bans on tape recording and on radio
and television broadcasting reduce the accuracy and timeliness of
the reports the press media are able to disseminate and preclude
the unique involvement of the public in the workings of government that live and filmed television reports can provide. This impeding of the right of the press and of the free flow of information
can be validated only by a showing that tape recording and broadcasting significantly endanger the smooth operation of the legislative process.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE

RECORDING AND BROADCASTING OF PUBLIC LEGISLATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

Several state courts have rejected the first amendment challenges

of members of the press to rules restricting the recording or
broadcasting of legislative proceedings. 8' The ground for these
decisions,8 2 however, has been that members of the press have no
pers, their political knowledge, and their perceptions of legislators' trustworthiness and
openness. Atkin & Greenberg, Public Television and Political Socialization, in 1974 Heafings,
supra note 4, at App. 552-53. Justice Harlan recognized the beneficial effects of television
broadcasting of public events in Estes, when he said: "Many trials are newsworthy, and
televising them might well provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the public. Furthermore, television is capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the public with the judicial process in action." Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 156
(1973) (no right to tape record public state legislative proceedings); 1590 Broadcasting Corp.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 N.H. 258, 306 A.2d 49 (N.H. 1973) (no right to tape record
public utilities commission rate hearing). Educational Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Ronan, 68
Misc. 2d 776, 328 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (no right to teleise public utilities commission rate hearing); Davidson v.Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 244 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup.
Ct. 1963) (no right to tape record city council meetings). But see cases cited note 86 ii/ra.
Although 1590 and Ronan involved regulatory commissions considering public utility rate
increases, such hearings do not differ functionally from legislative proceedings. See note 97
infra. See geneially Bennett, Broadcast Coverage o1Administrative Proceedings, 67 Nw. U.L. REV.
528 (1972).
82. The courts in two cases also suggest that they have no power to invalidate legislatixe
rules. Educational Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Ronan, 68 Misc. 2d 776, 779, 328 N.Y.S.2d
107, 110 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Daiidson v. Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 1056, 244 N.Y.S.2d
385, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Even congressional rules, however, are not immune from constitutional re\iew where they "ignore constitutional restraints or %iolate fundamental
rights." United States v.Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892): see Groppi v.Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 499507 (1972) (by implication): Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1973): cl.Yellin v.United States, 374
U.S. 109, 111 (1963).
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independent right to record public proceedings, at least by means
other than pencil and paper, even in the absence of any showing of
harm to the legislative process. 83 But the right of the press to
84
gather news has clearly been recognized by the Supreme Court,
and limiting the press to the use of alternative, less effective
methods of recording impedes the flow of public information that
the constitutional protection of the freedom of the press is intended to guarantee.8 5 As the Estes decision indicated, such limitations may be justified when there is a substantial probability that
the effects of tape recording and broadcasting would significantly
endanger the fair and efficient conduct of the proceedings. Few of
the prejudicial effects recognized in Estes exist in the context of
legislative proceedings, however, and even those harms that do
exist are not substantial enough to justify the restriction of the first
amendment rights of the press. Thus, the few courts that have
required that legislative rules restricting the right of the press to
record and broadcast be justified by a showing of actual or impend8 6
ing harm to the proceedings have held the rules unconstitutional.
A.

Effects of Recording and Broadcasting on Public Legislative
Proceedings

Of the three kinds of potential harm envisioned by the Estes
Court-increased publicity, physical disruption, and psychological
reactions to recording-only the latter two need be considered in
evaluating restrictive rules of legislatures. Increased publicity resulting from the broadcast of legislative proceedings is in no way
detrimental to the legislative process. Legislators, unlike jurors,
may properly be influenced by the expressions of community opinion that news coverage encourages; they need not-and should
not-be insulated from their constituents. The public is expected
to take part in the legislative process by electing their representatives, and each election represents to some extent an expression of
the judgment of the people about their representatives' actions and
83.

See Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Md. House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 5-6, 8, 310 A.2d

156, 158-59, 160 (1973); 1590 Broadcasting Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 N.H. 258,
260, 306 A.2d 49, 51 (1973); Davidson v. Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 1055-56, 244
N.Y.S.2d 385, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1963). But cf. Educational Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Ronan, 68
Misc. 2d 776, 778, 328 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct. 1972); note 82supra.
84. See text and notes at notes 12-16 supra.
85.

See text and notes at notes 7-11 supra.

86. Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(right to tape record city council meeting); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. City of Asbury Park, 7
P & F RADIO REG.
160, at 2062 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div., Sept. 24, 1951) (right to
radio-broadcast public hearing on proposed imuLnicipal luxury tax).
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positions while in office. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
news coverage of governmental issues, debates, and decisions is
essential if the public is to perform its role in the electoral process
wisely and effectively. 87 Increasing the quality, accuracy, or amount
of legislative news coverage, given this constitutional scheme, can
only benefit the legislature and its constituency. 8 The criminal
trial analogy, insofar as it involves the effects of publicity, is inapposite.
The danger of physical disruption from recording mechanisms,
however, exists for legislative proceedings as well as for criminal
trials. As Estes implies, 89 this danger by itself could not justify the
prohibition of potentially disruptive means of recording, because
the press (and specifically the broadcast media) are capable of
operating without the chaos sometimes associated with them.9 0
Legislators certainly would be hampered by having to contend with
the commotion of roaming camera operators and other personnel,
blinding lights, clumsy cables, and other physical distractions.
Many legislative chambers, however, have raised press galleries
where equipment can be installed to minimize physical distractions;
where quarters are cramped, pooling of coverage is possible. 91
Audio signals can often be supplied by microphones that already
feed the legislative chamber's own sound system. a Some legislative
chambers have enough natural light to permit filming and telecast87. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. %. Cohn, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1044, 1046 (1975);
Time, Inc. %.Hill, 385 U.S. 374,388-89 (1967): Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218-19 (1966).
New York Times Co. %.Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964): Grosjean v. American Press,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). See also Branzburg %.Haves, 408 U.S. 665, 726-27 & n.3 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting): Comment, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462,
1464 (1973).
This participatory function inolves a more active role of the public than the watchdog
function that underlies the requirement of public trials. See note 42 supra. In addition,
publicizing legislative proceedings serves a legitimate educative function that has been rejected in the context of criminal trials. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 575-76 (1964)
(Warren, C.J., concurring); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1952);
Application of United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign, Activities, 361
F. Supp. 1270, 1281-82 (D.D.C. 1973): United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325, 331 (N.D.
11. 1961): Yesawich, Televising and BroadcastingTrials, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 701, 702-03 (1952).
88. When there are compelling reasons to prevent dissemination of information about
legislative proceedings, legislatihe bodies may achie~e that purpose by meeting in closed or
executive session. See note 1 supra. But when the proceedings are open to public and press,
limitations on tape recording and broadcasting cannot be justified as means of reducing
publicity.
89. See note 48 supra.
90. See, e.g., Educational Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Ronan, 68 Misc. 2d 776, 778, 328
N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
91. 1970 Heaings, supia note 72, at 53.
92. Id. at 31, 56, 82.
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ing without any supplemental lighting,9 3 especially with the continuing development of more sensitive video equipment. 94 Thus
legislative rules aimed at preventing physical disruption by recording equipment or personnel can be much more narrowly drawn
than in the form of a flat prohibition, requiring instead that the
least disruptive methods be used. 95 Moreover, physical interference
is readily ascertainable, so that a presumption of its occurrence
need never be substituted for proof.
Recording and broadcasting may have psychological effects on
legislators as well as on trial participants. Hence, although legislators' personal feelings about recording cannot be taken into
account,9 6 changes in their behavior that are detrimental to the
legislative process may be. 97 Proponents of rules prohibiting legislative recordings argue that the legislators' knowledge that recording or broadcasting is taking place would both distract the legislators and inspire them to "grandstand. '9 8 The distraction, it is
said, would result from the legislators' anxiety about how they
sound or look. 99 The "grandstanding" argument implicitly assumes
93.

S.

94.

N. MINOW, J.

MICKELSON, THE ELECTRIC MIRROR

(hereinafter

cited

as

MARTIN

182 (1972).

& L. MITCHELL,

PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION

PRESIDENTIAL

TELEVISION];
JOINT COMIM. ON
OPERATIONS, BROADCASTING HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEEDINGS, S. REP. No.

124 (1973)

CONGRESSIONAL

1275, 93d Cong.,

2d Sess. 50-51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT].

95. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, authorizing congressional committees to
allow broadcast coverage of their hearings, takes reasonable precautions to prevent physical
disruption of proceedings. It limits the permissible number and position of television and
still cameras, requires that hearing participants' sight lines be kept unobstructed, and allows
the installation of only enough additional lighting to provide the minimum level required by
the current state of television technology. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-510, §116(f)(3)-(13), 84 Stat. 1154-55.
Similarly, the Administrative Conference of the United States has adopted a recommendation that federal administrative agencies permit broadcast coverage of some proceedings,
but with the proviso that:
Audio visual coverage should be conducted with minimal physical intrusion on the
normal course of the proceeding. Agencies should impose reasonable restrictions on
lighting, multiple microphones and other possible sources of disruption.
RECOMMENDATION 32, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1971-72 REPORT
78 (1972).
96. See note 66 supra.
97. Even these behavioral effects are unlikely to have as great an impact on the proceedings or to threaten as fundamental a right as in the trial context. Because of the different
interests involved, the Administrative Conference specifically excluded adjudicatory hearings from its recommendations for broadcast coverage of federal administrative agency
proceedings. RECOMMENDATION 32, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1971-72 REPORT 77 (1972). See Bennett, supra note 81, at 548-52.
98. See, e.g., S. MICKELSON,supra note 93, at 123; CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT,
supra note 94, at 19; 1970 Hearings, supra note 72, at 50-51; 116 CONG. REC. 24971 (1970)
(remarks of Representative Dennis); 65 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (1952).

99.

S.MICKELSON, supra note 93; 1970 Hearings, supra note 72, at 50.
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that legislators meeting in public session speak or act differently in
the presence of some forms of recording than in their absence.
The premise, rarely stated clearly, may be either that legislators
would say what they think their constituents want to hear rather
than what the legislators themselves think is best, 0 0 that demagogic
legislators will use recorded or broadcast legislative proceedings to
stir the public's passions,' 01 or that legislators will vie with each
other for recorded or broadcast press coverage with an eye toward
future political campaigns.' 0 2 The fear, then, is that recording and
broadcasting will affect the quality and the length of legislative
debate and decision making.
The likelihood of distraction of legislators due to anxiety or
nervousness about being recorded or broadcast is considerably less
than in the case of jurors. Unlike jurors, legislators are already
(and voluntarily) public figures; they are accustomed to speaking
and acting in proceedings with knowledge that their words and
actions will receive widespread attention, and many have had experience with sound and video recording. Even if this were not so,
the repeated exposure of legislators to these recording methods
over the course of several legislative sessions would give them a
greater opportunity to become accustomed to being recorded or
broadcast than a juror or criminal trial witness would have.
Similarly, the likely incidence and detrimental effects of "grandstanding," whatever its form, are not great. Legislators who wish to
conform their positions to those that they think a majority of their
constituents support are likely to do so with or without recording.
Those who do not wish to do so but feel that they must as their
positions become more widely publicized are reacting to electoral
pressures; as noted before, such pressures are an inherent and
proper part of the legislative process. The essence of such legislators' complaints is that the public would not be as ignorant of
their positions as before.
Demagogic legislators exist and sometimes engage in improper
conduct during legislative sessions, and it may be argued that giving such conduct more widespread press coverage might encourage its growth. Thoughtful commentators have suggested, however, that the opposite effect would result; as the demagogic
100. More specifically, the danger has been characterized as the likelihood that necessary
compromise would be inhibited. CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 94, at
18-19.
101. Cf. 116 CONG. REc. 24971-72 (1970) (exchange between Representatives Dennis and
Harvey).
102. CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 94, at 19.
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legislator's constituents become more aware of his objectionable
behavior, his electoral position would erode.10 3 This argument
rests on faith in the ability of the electorate to judge its own legislators by appropriate standards, an assumption that is difficult to
prove or disprove but one that underlies both the system of democratic elections and the Supreme Court's view that protection of the
freedom of the press is essential to the proper workings of
04
government.
Whether incumbent legislators would compete for coverage to
gain electoral advantage is also uncertain, as is the harm that would
be caused if they did. If the concern is that legislative time will be
wasted on speeches that would not have been made if they had not
been recorded or broadcast, limits on the length and subject matter
of speeches imposed by the presiding officer'0 5 or by specific rules
would deal with the problem sufficiently, more directly, and less
restrictively. If the concern is that incumbents, by taking advantage
of free press coverage, will increase their chances of reelection
against challengers, the combined effects of closer control over
electioneering by the chair or through specific rules and the recognition of that advantage by the electorate' 0 6 would similarly
minimize the danger more directly and less restrictively.
Several other dangers of recording and broadcasting that have
been raised in courts and by legislators rest on grounds that are
improperly considered in evaluating a first amendment claim. The
arguments are that broadcasters would distort their coverage
through misleading editing,'0 7 that commercial sponsorship of
legislative broadcasts should not be permitted, 0 8 that the public
103. See PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION, supra note 94, at 107 (attributing the decline in
Senator Joseph McCarthy's support to the viewing by a wide audience of his televised
testimony during Senate committee hearings in 1954); cf. 116 CONG. REC. 24972 (1970).
104. See text and note at note 87 supra.
105. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11, 21-22, 24-25 (1973) (Rules VIII (3), XIX
(1)-(6), XXII (2), indicating possible limits on subject matter and length of debate).
106. Some commentators have suggested that if the problem arose, it might be self-correcting, since "the ability to speak in congressional debate is an inherent advantage of incumbency; public resentment would soon cure abuses of televised debates for electioneering." PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION, supra note 94, at 213-14 n.67.
107. See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 72, at 34-36, 50, 54.
108. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 116(f)(1), 84 Stat.
1154, forbids commercial sponsorship of live committee broadcasts. The court in Davidson
v. Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 244 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1963) characterized the
danger of commercial sponsorship as allowing the legislative process to be "turned into a
show where portions of tape-recorded material can be played on radio or television between
the trumpeters of modern merchandising expounding the virtues of tooth paste, cigarettes,
soap powder or the mellowness of a new beer." Id. at 1055, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
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the broadcasts as "entertainment" rather than
would view
"education"1 0 9 and that broadcasters would exert increasing control over the timing and format of proceedings. 1 0° The potential
for distortion in reporting, always present, has never justified prior
restraints. The fear is only that editorial judgment, a prerogative
clearly protected by the first amendment,"' will be exercised in an
objectionable manner. Similarly, the commercial nature of a2
medium does not affect its claim to first amendment protection.'
Moreover, in view of the high costs of broadcasting, to forbid sponsorship might well be to preclude broadcasting altogether." 3 The
next argument against recording and broadcasting, based on the
elusive distinction between publications that "entertain" and those
that "educate," is irrelevant in light of the Supreme Court's holdings that both kinds of publications are within the ambit of the first
amendment. 1 4 In addition, at least one study shows that broadcast
coverage of legislative proceedings can have significant educational
value." 5 Finally, the timing and format of legislative proceedings
are firmly within the legislature's control;"16 although either
broadcasters or the public might suggest changes to facilitate
broadcast reporting of the proceedings," 7 the legislature could
properly decline to make them.
The potential dangers posed to legislative proceedings by recording and broadcasting-especially the psychological effects-are difficult to prove or disprove." 8 Reasons for expecting that such dangers are less likely to exist in legislative proceedings than in crimi109. See Davidson v. Common Council, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 1055, 244 N.Y.S.2d 385, 388
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
110. PRESIDENTIAL TELEVIsION, supra note 94, at 123.
111.

See text and notes at notes 10-11 supra.

112. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959). See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 397 (1967); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
113. It has been estimated that uninterrupted broadcasts of the House Judiciary
Committee's impeachment hearings cost each commercial network $1,000,000 per day in
lost advertising revenues. BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1974, at 18.
114. See, e.g.,Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
115. Atkin & Greenberg, supra note 80, at App. 482-566.
160
116. See, e.g., Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. City of Asbury Park, 7 P & F RADIO REG.
(N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div., Sept. 24, 1951).
117. Some writers, concerned about the imbalance between presidential and congressional power and access to channels of communication to the public, hale suggested that
Congress allow television broadcasts of "specially scheduled prime-time evening sessions at
which the most important matters before it each term are discussed, debated, and then %oted
upon." PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION, supra note 94, at 122.

118. As the Estes Court stated in concluding that prejudice should be presumed in the
criminal trial context, "one cannot put his finger on [television's] specific mischief and proxe
with particularity wherein he was prejudiced." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965).
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nal trials and are less likely to be detrimental when they do exist
have been discussed above. Actual experience with recording and
broadcasting further supports the conclusion that they do not
harm public legislative proceedings.
Many state and local legislative bodies currently permit recording and broadcasting of their public proceedings,1 1 9 as do many
other nations' highest legislative bodies.1 20 This fact is relevant to
the ultimate legal judgment, for the Court in Estes gave weight to
2
the fact that forty-eight states prohibited courtroom televising,' '
and the Fifth Circuit in the Columbia Broadcastingcase emphasized
22
the fact that no other court prohibited courtroom sketching.
Although a simple comparison of the number of bodies that permit recording and broadcasting with those that prohibit the activities cannot be determinative of the constitutional issue, the fact
that a substantial number do permit such coverage supports an
inference that it does not endanger the proceedings.
Hearings before the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations on the issue of whether Congress should permit broadcast
coverage of its floor proceedings 2 3 provide more direct evidence
that recording and broadcasting do not threaten legislative proceedings. Studies presented to the Committee on the effect of telecasting sessions of the Florida and Connecticut state legislatures
concluded that psychological discomfort and behavioral changes
119. In 1965 the National Association of Broadcasters reported that nineteen states
permitted daily radio and television coverage of their legislatures. 1970 Hearings, supra
note 72, at 53. It appears that that number has increased since 1965. See id. at 53-56;
1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at App. 470-71, 949-50; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
JOINT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND MASS

COMMUNICATIONS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 47 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited
as MASS COMMUNICATIONS]. Cf. note 4 supra.

120. Of fifty national legislative bodies surveyed in 1968, twenty-nine allowed radio
coverage and twenty-one allowed telecasts. 1974 Hearings,supra note 4, App. at 918. Among
them are Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and
West Germany. A number of Canadian provinces also allow broadcasting. Id. at 918-24; S.
MICKELSON, supra note 93, at 182-83. The United Nations also allows broadcasts of its
proceedings. 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at App. 919-20.
121. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). See note 30 supra.
122. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir.
1974). See note 55 supra.
123. Recording and broadcasting House and Senate floor proceedings has never been
allowed except for ceremonial occasions such as State of the Union addresses. See generally E.
CHESTER, RADIO, TELEVISION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 163-64 (1969); S. MICKELSON, supra
note

93,

at

177-78;

PRESIDENTIAL

TELEVISION,

supra note

94,

at

106-07;

MASS

note 119, at 24-26. Shortly before the resignation of President
Nixon, however, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution to permit broadcasts of
impeachment proceedings. H.R. RES. 802, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 CONG. REC.
H7851-54 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1974).
COMMUNICATIONS, supra

1975]

Right to Broadcast Legislative Proceedings

in legislators detrimental to proceedings were minimal and
short-lived. 124 Both studies endorsed expansion of such coverage. 12 5 Witnesses also testified as to improvements in legislative
decorum, attendance, and efficiency after broadcasts of public proceedings began.' 2 6 On the basis of these hearings, the Joint Committee recommended that, in addition to the broadcast coverage of
committees already permitted, 2 7 broadcast coverage of congres28
sional floor proceedings be authorized for a one year trial period.1
B.

Failure of the Asserted Justification for the First Amendment
Restriction
Rules that prohibit tape recording or broadcasting of public
legislative proceedings, as discussed above, produce a significant
diminution in the effectiveness of the reporting process and in the
quality of the information about the proceedings that is dissemi124. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at App. 645-60, 734-54.
125. The findings are summarized in the Joint Committee's Report:
The adverse results [of televising legislatures] often thought to be most damaging to
proper decorum--"grandstanding" for the cameras-were either not in evidence or
disappeared quickly, as those so inclined were subjected to ribbing from their colleagues. Rather than finding that they could not "be themselves" and "keep their minds
on their business," particularly in Florida, where the proceedings were recorded on
videotape in their entirety, Members of both Houses soon ignored the camera's presence and got "back to business as usual."
CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 94, at 52. See 1974 Hearings,supra note 4,
at App. 653-60, 748-49.
126. CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 94, at 52; 1974 Hearings, supra
note 4, App. at 751. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 72, at 31-32, 54, 56.
127. Prior to passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510,
§ 116, 84 Stat. 1153-55, only Senate committees could broadcast their meetings. Each committee of the House of Representatives now may also decide whether to permit broadcast
coverage of its proceedings.
Significantly, when witnesses subpoenaed to testify before televised congressional hearings
have objected, the courts have declined to follow the courtroom analogy, holding that a
committee is not an incompetent tribunal simply because it is being televised. Hartman v.
United States, 290 F.2d 460, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd per curian on other grounds, 370 U.S.
724 (1962); United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965
(1952); United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325, 328-35 (N.D. Il1. 1961). Contra, United
States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407, 408 (D.D.C. 1952) (disapproved in Hintz). The
witness's right to privacy is not violated in such cases. United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Stipp. 325,
328-35 (N.D. Ill. 1961). Courts have also rejected the argument that the resultant publicity
might endanger a witness's rights in subsequent criminal trials, Application of United States
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270, 1280-82
(D.D.C. 1973), and they have been reluctant to delay such trials or dismiss charges because of
the publicity, United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 109-15 (1st Cir. 1952) (distinguished in Application
of United States Senate Select Conim. and Mitchell).
128. CONGRESSIONAL BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 94, at 53-56; H.R. REP. No.
1458, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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nated to the public. This restriction of the freedom of the press is
especially significant because of the fundamental importance of
protecting the free flow of timely and accurate information about
the legislative process to the citizenry. Courts considering the right
of the press to record proceedings involving even less fundamental
public interests have required a showing of an actual and immediate threat to the proceedings to justify restrictions on that
right. 12 9 A substantial governmental interest in preventing adverse
effects on the legislative process must certainly be shown before a
rule significantly impeding the right to gather news can be
upheld. 30
The Supreme Court in Estes recognized the overriding interest
of the government in preserving the fairness of criminal trial proceedings, and found such a strong probability of prejudice in allowing trials to be tape recorded and televised that it held that such
recording methods must be restricted within the courtroom. That
probability of impairment of the proceedings, however, does not
exist in the legislative setting. Increased publicity enhances rather
than impairs legislative proceedings, and the effects of physical
disruption and psychological reaction by legislators appear in actual practice to be minimal. The threat to the conduct of the legislative process posed by tape recording and broadcasting is thus
virtually nonexistent, and even at most could not be considered as
raising a substantial governmental interest.
Even if certain of the asserted dangers were shown to be actual
and immediate, they could be prevented by other means less restrictive of the press's right to gather news than a flat prohibition
of tape recording or broadcasting.' 3' Physical disruption may be
minimized by rules such as those governing the broadcasting of
congressional committee hearings. 32 Psychological effects, although difficult to detect and to prevent, may also be minimized by
rules and practices that are aimed directly at eliminating the
specific harms foreseen.
Thus, legislative rules that absolutely prohibit tape recording
and broadcasting of legislative proceedings neither further a substantial governmental interest nor protect interests that they might
129. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 106-07 (5th
Cir. 1974); Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1970); text and notes at notes
53-59 supra; cf. note 87 supra.
130. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811, 2822-24 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
131. See cases cited at note 130 supra.
132. See note 95 supra.
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serve by means that are least restrictive of first amendment interests. The constitutional right of the press, essential to providing
the public information that guarantees the proper working of the
democratic process, may therefore not be restricted.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional right of the press to gather news has been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court but has been held to be outweighed by other substantial interests in Branzburg, Pell, and Estes.
Many legislative bodies have recognized that the right of the press
to record their proceedings should not be unduly restricted, and
have permitted tape recording and broadcasting. Where rules prohibiting such recording methods still exist, the asserted dangers to
the legislative process that they are intended to prevent fail to
justify the restriction of the first amendment interests that they
produce.
James D. Alt

